One underexplored factor directly affecting firms' use of trademarks relates to the fees associated with obtaining a mark. This paper provides econometric estimates of the fee elasticity of demand for trademark applications. Using a panel of monthly international trademark applications, I find that a 10-percent increase in fees leads to a 2.5-4.0-percent decrease in applications. The econometric analysis also highlights that trademark filings react strongly to economic activity. The results bear implications for literature on the value of trademarks and for the use of trademarks as innovation indicator. Specifically, low elasticity estimates suggest that trademarks provide significant economic value to their owners relative to their costs. However, one must exercise caution when comparing trademark numbers across countries to the extent that fees might differ substantially.
Introduction
This paper contributes to trademark research by providing estimates of the fee elasticity of demand for trademark protection. Such estimates matter for at least three reasons. First, they offer us a window on the value of trademarks. The price elasticity of demand for a good depends on the economic value it brings to its owner relative to its cost. Thus, low fee elasticity estimates would suggest that trademarks provide significant economic value to their owners. Second, understanding which features of the trademark system affect trademark usage provides a better understanding of the use of trademark data as innovation indicator. If fees are found to matter, scholars and policy analysts would need to exercise caution when comparing trademark activity across countries. Third, sound price elasticity estimates would also contribute to evidence-based policymaking. Changes in the schedule of fees always raise budget concerns and price elasticity estimates would help Intellectual Property (IP) offices to forecast potential revenue changes.
Because trademark filing fees are inexpensive relative to standard marketing budgets, it would be tempting to assume that these fees are of secondary importance in the filing decision. This assumption is misguided. Lessons learned from patents, another type of IP right, suggest that application fees have significant effects on firm behavior (e. g. de Rassenfosse and Jaffe 2018). So far, we have little knowledge of this subject with respect to trademarks.
The empirical analysis focuses on trademark applications filed through the Madrid system, which is the primary international system for facilitating the registration of trademarks in multiple jurisdictions (so-called international trademarks). A key feature of the Madrid system is that the application fee must be paid in Swiss francs to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which is based in Geneva. Hence, the effective fee paid by applicants from the various member states of the Madrid protocol fluctuates based on the exchange rate relative to the Swiss franc. The empirical analysis in this paper exploits this source of heterogeneity to estimate price elasticity. It relies on a panel of monthly applications filed from 2004 to 2013 in 42 countries, which adds up to approximately 340,000 trademark applications.
To briefly summarize the results, estimates of the fee elasticity of demand for trademarks range from −0.25 to −0.40. In other words, a 10-percent increase in fees led to a 2.5 to 4.0 percent decrease in the demand for trademarks. These estimates are substantially lower than those presented in Herz and Mejer (2016) for national trademarks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the trademark filing process and discusses elements likely to affect the fee elasticity of demand for trademarks. Section 3 introduces the econometric model. Section 4 presents the data, and section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes with implications for trademark research.
Background

The international trademark system
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks was established by the 1891 Madrid Agreement with the aim of facilitating the registration of marks worldwide. The Madrid System makes it possible to protect a mark in about 100 countries by obtaining an international registration that takes effect in each of the designated contracting nation-parties. A firm files a trademark application in one of three official languages (English, French, Spanish) with any participating trademark office, usually its national office. The office then forwards the application to WIPO. The payment of fees occurs at the time of filing and must be made in Swiss francs directly to WIPO.
Once WIPO receives the application, it conducts a formal examination of the international application, which, if approved, is recorded in the International Register. WIPO then notifies the IP offices in all the territories in which the firm wishes to have its mark protected. It is then the responsibility of each national IP office to perform a substantive examination and decide on issuance in accordance with its legislation.
Insights from economic theory
To the best of my knowledge, Herz and Mejer (2016) is the only study looking at the fee elasticity of demand for trademarks. These authors use quarterly fee and filing data from 20 European offices from 1993 to 2011 to estimate the sensitivity of national filings to fees. In this manner, they find a fee elasticity of −1.05, meaning that a 10-percent increase in fees leads to a 10.5-percent reduction in trademark filings. Thus, existing evidence would suggest that trademarks are very sensitive to fees. This section uses insights from economic theory to reflect on the price elasticity of demand for trademarks.
First, the price elasticity of demand for a good depends on the availability of substitutes. There are no clear substitutes for protecting brand names and brand marks, which would suggest a low elasticity. 1 However, when filing a trademark application, firms have a variety of choices. They can seek protection at the national IP office, at the regional (European Union) level by filing a 'Community Trade Mark' at the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM), or at the global level through the Madrid System at the WIPO.
Second, the price elasticity of demand for a good also depends on the economic value it provides to its owner. Regarding patents, scholars have long demonstrated the existence of a causal premium associated with patenting (Arora, Ceccagnoli, and Cohen 2008; Jensen, Thomson, and Yong 2011) . By contrast, trademark research is still in an early stage and the majority of studies have documented a positive correlation between trademark protection and various indicators of firm performance (Buddelmeyer, Jensen, and Webster 2010; Flikkema, De Man, and Castaldi 2014; Greenhalgh and Rogers 2006; Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco 2009; Mendonça, Santos Pereira and Mira Godinho 2004; Sandner and Block 2011) . Because the present paper focuses on the most valuable trademarksthose for which firms seek international coverageelasticity is likely to be low relative to the estimates obtained by Herz and Mejer (2016) for national trademarks.
Third, the price elasticity of a good depends on its actual price level and, in particular, on how much of the firm's overall budget it represents. There is a general sense that the trademark application process is inexpensive. As one practitioner puts it: 'Not only is trademarking your intellectual property easy, it's also extremely inexpensive in the grand scheme of things. Many trademarks can be had for a few hundred dollars, and they never expire.' 2 And indeed, the cost of trademark protection is quite low compared to market research and marketing expenditures. It is limited to drafting and filing fees, which should suggest a low elasticity. 3 The basic fee for filing a trademark in 2018 is 653 CHF at WIPO, 850 EUR at OHIM, 400 USD at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and 250 AUD at IP Australia.
To sum up, the lack of substitutes, the economic benefits that trademarks confer and the low price level suggest that the demand for trademark filing should be fairly inelastic. However, previous estimates point to a highly elastic demand function.
Econometric model
As opposed to research on patent filings, research on the aggregate determinants of trademark filings remains in its early stages. Herz and Mejer (2016) use a country's gross domestic product (GDP) as the main covariate to capture both demand and supply side factors. de Rassenfosse (2017) uses GDP to capture demand side and 'brand equity' investment to capture supply side. The brand equity investment series is computed using data on advertising expenditures (collected from surveys or from input-output tables) and costs of market research (collected from input-output tables). 4 Unfortunately, this series is available for only a limited number of countries.
The main covariates used in the present empirical analysis are GDP and trademark filing fees, explained in greater detail in Section 4 below. A feature of trademark fees at WIPO is that applicants must pay them in Swiss francs. Exogenous variations in the effective fees paid by applicants in country i stem from variations in the exchange rate of country i's currency to the Swiss franc.
Both Hertz and Mejer (2016) and de Rassenfosse (2017) model the demand for trademarks using a partial adjustment model à la Nerlove (1958) , following de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012) for patents. This model captures a great deal of cross-country heterogeneity in the number of trademark filings by including the lagged number of trademark applications. The basic model of trademark filings by applicants from country i in month t is given by
where T Ã it denotes the steady-state level of trademark applications, Y it is the GDP, F it is the filing fee, and ν it is the error term. This model uses a dynamic process to allow for the possibility that the number of trademark filings does not immediately adjust to its steady-state level. The 'distance' between T Ã it and the actual T it closes partially in each period as firms adjust to the new level of fees and other changes in economic conditions:
with 0 < λ ≤ 1 as the speed of adjustment. Combining these two equations and taking natural logs yields
where α 1 and α 2 capture long-term elasticities. The regression model is
where β 2 = λα 2 is the short-term fee elasticity and β 0i is the country fixed effect. One should take note of three econometric issues. The first relates to the possibility of spurious results when the series are not stationary (Yule 1926) . The next section assesses the presence of unit roots using a Fisher-type test. This test is well suited to an unbalanced panel with a large time dimension. Anticipating the results, I find evidence that the trademark filing series are stationary.
Second, the presence of the lagged dependent variable is a source of endogeneity when the series exhibit serial correlation (Nickell 1981) . Although the problem is especially acute when the time dimensionality is small, I nevertheless correct for the possibility of dynamic panel bias using the bias approximation in Bun and Kiviet (2003) that is extended to unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005) .
Another potential pitfall is the simultaneity bias typically associated with price elasticity estimates (i.e. price affects demand and vice-versa). A valuable feature of the current set-up is that it presents no such concern: the application fee at WIPO has not been adjusted over a 10-year period, although the worldwide demand for international trademarks grew at an annual rate of 4.75 percent during the study period. Fee changes come from variations in the exchange rate, which are exogenous to the change in trademark filing numbers. However, the identification strategy opens the door to a confounding factor, namely changes in economic conditions, that may affect both the exchange rate and the demand for trademarks. Although the GDP variable accounts for long-term economic changes, a more finely grained indicator of economic activity is needed. Thus, the empirical analysis includes the monthly level of the country's industrial production as a control variable.
Data
The dependent variable is the number of international trademark applications filed at WIPO by applicants from country i in month t (T it ). The sample includes 42 countries with an average of more than five applications per month during the 01/2004-12/ 2013 period. 5 The key independent variable is the filing fee (F it ). The basic fee for filing a trademark is 653 CHF. The fee is to be paid in CHF, has not changed since 1996, and is converted into nominal local currency using monthly exchange rate series obtained from the foreign exchange trading platform Oanda.com. The fee values are then converted into 2011 constant international dollars using the GDP deflators from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
The main control variable is yearly GDP (Y it ), obtained from the IMF WEO database. Monthly series were obtained by linear interpolation of the yearly series. The variable Y it is reported in 2011 constant international dollars.
As discussed above, the model includes monthly industrial production (I it ), which is obtained from the OECD Key Short Term Indicators database. The variable is available for 28 countries and is therefore not included in the baseline specification; it is expressed as an index that takes the value of 1 in January 2006. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the month of December 2010. The number of trademark applications ranges from 2 for Iceland to 440 for Germany, with a mean of 68. The fee ranges from USD PPP 454 for Australia to USD PPP 15,616 for Estonia, with a mean of USD PPP 1260. In terms of GDP, the smallest country in the sample is Iceland and the largest is the United States. Appendix Table A1 provides the list of 42 countries included in the sample together with the country-specific means and standard deviations of the variables T it and F it . Table 2 presents the results of a Fisher-type panel unit root test. This test is well suited to the data because there are many time periods and the panel is unbalanced. The null hypothesis is that all individual series contain a unit root, and the alternative is that at least one series is stationary. The table reports the p-values associated with the inverse normal Z statistic. The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis regarding trademark applications (with 1 or 3 lags) and GDP (with 3 lags only). The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in the case of the fees series, suggesting the presence of a unit root. However, given that the dependent variable is stationary, there is no risk of spurious results. The elasticity appears to be higher in the post-2008 period than in the pre-2008 period. The estimates average −0.41 in the 2004-2007 period and −0.60 in the 2008-2013 period. This sharp increase in the elasticity parameter may be a consequence of the global financial crisis (GFC): the worsening of economic conditions could have lowered the returns from new products, which could make trademarks more sensitive to fees. Table 3 presents baseline panel estimates for the sample of all 42 countries. The results shown in column (1) suggest that the short-term fee elasticity is −0.290, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the fee leads to a 2.90 percent decrease in trademark applications. The corresponding long-term elasticity is reported in column (1) of Table 4 and reaches −0.334. The two values are close to one another because the speed of adjustment is close to 1 (λ = 1-0.132 = 0.868). In other words, firms adjust almost contemporaneously to the change in fees.
Results
Cross-section estimates
Dynamic panel estimates
Correcting for the dynamic bias in column (2) has virtually no impact on both the shortand long-term elasticity estimates. The regression models presented in columns (3)-(4) of (Bruno 2005 ). ***: p-value < 0.01; **: p-value < 0.05; *: p-value < 0.10. Constant term included but not reported. R 2 estimated as the square of the correlation coefficient between the actual and the predicted values. Table 3 control for time effects. The model in column (3) includes dummies for each individual month to capture global time effects that may affect all countries simultaneously. An F-test of joint statistical significance leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no time effect (p-value of 0.013). The model in column (4) additionally includes twelve monthly dummies to capture, for instance, the effect of measurement errors arising from the linear interpolation of yearly GDP series into monthly series. The dummies are jointly significantly different from zero (there seem to be more applications in the May-July period), but the coefficients associated with the fee variable remain largely unchanged.
The model in the last column tests whether the fee elasticity changed in the post-GFC period as suggested by the cross-section estimates presented in Figure 1 . The dummy variable GFC takes the value of 1 on or after January 2008 and 0 before. The point estimate of the parameter associated with the variable GFC t Ã ln F it is not statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting no change in the elasticity. This finding further indicates that the time effects and the GDP variable pick up changes in the economic environment in a satisfactory manner. Table 4 presents estimates of the long-term price elasticity that is recovered from the parameters in Table 3 . The elasticity ranges between −0.307 and −0.334, which is, as expected, substantially lower than the cross-section estimates presented in Figure 1 . Table 5 presents estimates performed on a subsample of countries for which industrial production data are available. As discussed above, we must control for the possibility that a change in economic conditions affects both the exchange rate and the demand for trademarks. The regression model presented in column (1) adopts the same specifications as the model in column (4) of Table 3 and serves to assess the sensitivity of the results to the use of a different sample. The estimate of the elasticity parameter is quantitatively similar but it is less precisely estimated.
The model presented in column (2) controls for industrial production at home. First, the considerable increase in model fit compared to column (1) is notable, suggesting that industrial production accounts for a non-trivial proportion of heterogeneity in trademark filings. The variable has a large and statistically significant effect on the demand for trademarks: a one-percent increase in industrial production leads to a 0.25percent increase in trademark filings. The price elasticity in column (2) is sensibly higher than in column (1), with a point estimate for the short-term elasticity at −0.338 and for the long-term elasticity at −0.392 (column 2 of Table 6 ).
The specification presented in column (3) enables an investigation of the effects of the global industrial production level (G it ), as measured by the GDP-weighted sum of production levels in each country except country i. The effect of global industrial production is imprecisely estimated, and the point estimate of the coefficient associated with the national production remains unchanged. (1)
(2) (3) (4) (5 pre-GFC) α 2 −0.334*** −0.334*** −0.309* −0.310** −0.307** ***: p-value < 0.01; **: p-value < 0.05; *: p-value < 0.10.
The long-term elasticities, which are presented in Table 6 , are slightly higher than those in Table 4 but are in the same general range.
Additional considerations
The present paper studies firms' reactions at the extensive margin (whether or not to file a trademark application) and omits firms' reactions at the intensive margin. Firms can alter the fees associated with a trademark application by changing the number of Nice classes it covers. Nice classes describe the 45 categories of goods and services in which the trademark is to be used. While firms have the option to file multiple single-class trademarks across different classes, they typically list different Nice classes in a multi-class trademark application. Thus, reactions at the intensive margin are unlikely to affect the results substantially. This conclusion is particularly true for international trademark applications, as the basic fee already covers three classes. In 2016, the average number of Nice classes per application was 1.40, well below 3. 6 Table 6 . Long-term fee elasticities (recovered from Table 5 ).
(1)
(2) (3) α 2 −0.250 −0.392* −0.397* ***: p-value < 0.01; **: p-value < 0.05; *: p-value < 0.10. The dependent variable is the log number of trademark applications. T it : Applications; Y it : GDP; F it : Fees; Y it : GDP; I it : Industrial production at home; G it : Global Industrial production. LSDVB: least square dummy variable correcting for dynamic panel bias estimator with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (Bruno 2005 ). ***: p-value < 0.01; **: p-value < 0.05; *: p-value < 0.10. The constant term is included but not reported. R 2 is estimated as the square of the correlation coefficient between the actual and the predicted values.
In a similar vein, the fee indicator does not consider designation fees. These fees, which are jurisdiction-specific, depend on where applicants want to protect their marks. They can be paid either at the time of filing or subsequently to international registration. Total designation fees vary from one trademark application to another; they are endogenous to the applicant's budget and the trademark's value. Accounting for the effect of designation fees would require detailed trademark-level data, which is outside the scope of the present study. That said, the role of designation fees on the demand for trademarks is likely to be negligible; most of the effect would logically occur at the intensive margin. Indeed, similar evidence on patent validation fees at the European Patent Office, which are due once a patent is granted, suggests an effect on applicant's validation behavior (Harhoff et al. 2009 ).
The present analysis also omits agent fees, which can account for a substantial share of the overall trademark budget. The omission of agent fees is common to all studies on the price elasticity of demand for IP rights due to the difficulty of assembling panel data for a large number of countries (let alone a single country). Moreover, one can expect great heterogeneity in agent fees. In the context of this study, changes in official fees are orthogonal to changes in agent fees such that elasticity estimates are unbiased.
Finally, this paper estimates the own-price elasticity of international trademarks. It would also be interesting to study the cross-price elasticity, particularly with respect to European Community trademarks. This research question is outside the scope of the present paper, but it is worth emphasizing that the estimates are not affected by the omission of substitutes. Indeed, variations in the prices of substitutes are exogenous to variations in the prices of international trademarks. Another interesting avenue for future research involves estimating the fee elasticity for different groups of applicants (e.g. first-time applicants, startups and SMEs).
Conclusion
The importance of trademarks to marketing and innovation practices should encourage scholars to study how the design of the trademark system affects firm behavior. This paper takes a step in this direction by studying the price elasticity of demand for international trademark applications. The long-term price elasticity of demand for trademarks is between −0.25 and −0.40, depending on model specification and sample composition.
Another notable finding relates to the fact that economic conditions strongly affect the number of trademark filings, as witnessed by the positive impact of the variable capturing industrial production. While trademark data are being used as an innovation indicator, this finding suggests that they are also an indicator of economic activity.
The fee elasticity estimates provide a window onto the economic returns of trademarks, a question that is receiving increasing attention in the literature (Schautschick and Greenhalgh 2016) . The stream of income associated with a trademark drives a firm's filing decision, and low elasticity estimates are suggestive of high returns from trademark protection, ceteris paribus. Thus, the results can be taken as an indication that international trademarks provide economic value to their owners (relative to their costs).
Interestingly, my estimates are substantially lower than those obtained by Herz and Mejer (2016) . One key difference between the two studies is that the present study focuses on trademarks that target the international market, whereas Herz and Mejer (2016) focus on trademarks filed in national offices in Europe. The difference in elasticity estimates between the two studies could signal the fragility of the national trademark systems. First, the average fee for filing a national trademark application process in European countries is around 300 USD (Herz and Mejer 2016, 1045) , which is substantially lower than the application fees at WIPO. Yet, the fee elasticity is substantially higher. Second, national trademark offices in Europe compete with the office for harmonization of internal market (OHIM). Applicants may find it more profitable to go directly to OHIM should national filing fees increase. And indeed, the number of applications at OHIM grew from about 50,000 in the early 2000s to about 150,000 today.
More generally, this paper also contributes to advancing knowledge on the use of trademark in scholarly research. It illustrates that factors unrelated to innovation and marketing activities affect the volume of trademark filings. Scholars sometimes employ the number of trademark applications as a measure of a firm's brand equity (e.g. Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco 2009; Bahadir, DeKinder, and Kohli 2015) . Nonetheless, this paper is a reminder that differences in the number of trademark filings across firms should be interpreted cautiously because they are affected by factors not directly related to brand equity. Although this paper uncovers macro-level determinants, micro-level determinants such as credit constraints, international exposure, or strategic considerations (e.g. Fink et al. 2014; Block et al. 2015; De Vries, Enrico Pennings, and Fisch 2017) also merit further research. At a more aggregate level, such estimates are important if we are to better understand the relevance of the use of trademark data for cross-country comparisons of innovative output. Trademark data are increasingly considered a worthy innovation output measure (Flikkema, De Man, and Castaldi 2014; Mendonça, Santos Pereira, and Mira Godinho 2004; Millot 2009 ), but the empirical analysis suggests that both the level of fees and economic activity significantly affect the number of trademark filings. A clear takeaway regarding the use of trademark data for cross-country comparison of innovation performance is that differences in the level of fees should be accounted for if there are large variations across countries. Conversely, they can be neglected if variations are small.
The results also bear implications for policy. A first implication concerns subsidies for trademark applications. Subsidies can come from national governments to domestic companies or in the form of rebates that WIPO grants to groups of applicants such as SMEs. The small fee elasticity combined with low level of filing fees would suggest a limited effectiveness of subsidies overallalthough I acknowledge that applicants in some countries or certain groups of applicants may be highly sensitive to fees. Second, regarding budgeting, trademark offices can use the results and apply the method to assess the potential impact of a planned fee reform. Third, this paper serves as a reminder that we know little about what the 'optimal' level of fees should be. Fees should be set to maximize social welfare, but the literature offers no clear practical guidelines regarding the setting of fees. Application fees are in constant USD PPP. The conversion of nominal fees into constant international dollars explains the variation in the fees paid by applicants in Switzerland.
